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ADMINISTRATIVE INSPECTIONS: 
THE LOOPHOLE IN THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK                              
APPELLATE DIVISION, SECOND DEPARTMENT 
Wisoff v. City of Schenectady1 
(decided April 2014) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The enforcement of city rental ordinances has allowed for a 
distinct form of searches under the Fourth Amendment, known as 
administrative inspections.  Building inspectors and governmental 
employees are able to search a home or building pursuant to these or-
dinances, which are often subject to constitutional scrutiny.2  Admin-
istrative searches pursuant to the Fourth Amendment are much dif-
ferent from criminal searches because an administrative search 
safeguards the health and safety of prospective tenants, while crimi-
nal searches seek to uncover evidence of criminal activity.  The paral-
lel between a criminal and administrative search is the possibility of a 
violation of the fundamental right to privacy. 
Although not expressly mentioned in the United States Con-
stitution, the right to privacy stands as one of the basic, fundamental 
rights of our system.3  The Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and article 1, section 12 of the New York Constitution 
both guarantee the right to privacy.4  The right to privacy has expand-
ed over time to increase protection and limit investigative techniques 
of law enforcement.  The Fourth Amendment also governs the rea-
sonableness of a civil search pursuant to a violation of a city or town 
ordinance.5 
 
1 984 N.Y.S.2d 207 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2014). 
2 12 N.Y. JUR.2D Buildings § 41 (2015). 
3 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
4 Wisoff, 984 N.Y.S.2d at 209. 
5 Id. 
1
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A search pursuant to a city or town ordinance is an adminis-
trative search and is the subject of this Case Note.6  This Case Note 
addresses the various approaches to assessing the constitutionality of 
an administrative inspection pursuant to the Fourth Amendment’s 
standard of reasonableness.  Specifically, this Case Note explores the 
issue raised in Wisoff v. City of Schenectady—whether Article 10 of 
Chapter 167 of the Code of Ordinances of the City of Schenectady 
violated the plaintiff’s right to be free from unreasonable searches 
under article 1, section 12 of the New York State Constitution7 and 
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.8 
Currently, there is no bright-line rule governing the constitu-
tionality of an administrative search.  When presented with this issue, 
federal courts broadly analyze the constitutionality of an administra-
tive inspection by applying a flexible standard of reasonableness.  To 
determine whether an administrative search is reasonable, federal 
courts conduct a balancing test, which weighs the governmental pur-
pose of the inspection against the individual’s privacy interest.  Fed-
eral courts consider additional factors, such as the scope of the intru-
sion and the need for the search.  As a result of this flexible standard, 
New York courts are confronted with determining the most appropri-
ate approach in analyzing the constitutionality of a given search.  
New York courts have adopted a narrow analysis to ensure that the 
policy of an ordinance does not impede upon the right to be free from 
warrantless searches.  Courts in New York have consistently ruled 
that ordinances requiring either consent or a warrant preserve an in-
dividual’s privacy interests and, therefore, are constitutional.9  By 
implementing such a narrow analysis, however, New York courts 
have failed to consider the constitutionality of the actual inspection.  
Ultimately, to determine if a specific inspection is constitutional, 
New York courts need not create a new test.  Rather, the adoption of 
a broad approach, commonly applied by federal courts, will allow 
New York courts to analyze the constitutionality of the actual inspec-
tion. 
 
6 Id. 
7 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. 
8 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
9 Wisoff, 984 N.Y.S.2d at 209. 
2
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II. DISCUSSION OF WISOFF 
The plaintiff, Andrew Wisoff, a building owner and resident 
of Nikayuna, New York, received a fine and was imprisoned for vio-
lating Article 10 of Chapter 167 of the Code of Ordinances of the 
City of Schenectady (Ordinance No. 85-75) (Schenectady Rental 
Certificate Ordinance) (“RCO”).10  The RCO provides specific guide-
lines detailing how to conduct an inspection, as well as the grounds 
for a violation.11  Specifically, the RCO requires a search to occur 
“within five working days of receipt of [such] application, [and] the 
Building Inspector [must] inspect the rental unit to determine if [it] is 
in compliance with certain enumerated housing standards.”12  The 
RCO also regulates when a search may be conducted13 and has estab-
lished guidelines for denying consent.14  Finally, the RCO assigns 
criminal and monetary penalties to any owner violating the ordi-
nance.15 
Owners of residential rental properties must comply with the 
standards set forth within the ordinance.  In requiring compliance, the 
RCO seeks “to promote the health and safety of tenants and to allevi-
ate conditions of substandard housing . . . .”16  The execution of the 
ordinance is likely to raise future constitutional claims because the 
ordinance allows building inspectors to inspect almost any area of the 
home.17 
 
10 The RCO provided that: 
[I]t shall be unlawful for any owner to permit the occupancy of any rent-
al unit subject to [former article X of the Code of the City of Schenec-
tady], unless such unit has a current and valid rental certificate or tempo-
rary rental certificate. 
Id. at 208. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 208 (stating that if the building inspector fails to perform the inspection within 
five days, the owner of the property can obtain a rental certificate that “is valid for 30 days 
or until the unit is inspected”). 
14 The RCO provided that if the owner denied consent, “the Building Inspector shall apply 
for a search warrant or court order in an appropriate court and upon a showing that there 
[are] reasonable grounds to believe that a building or rental unit within [the] building is rent-
ed and occupied in violation of the RCO.”  Wisoff, 984 N.Y.S.2d at 208. 
15 Id. at 209.  See also Schenectady, N.Y., Code § 167-67 Penalties for Offenses. “Each 
violation of this article shall be a misdemeanor and shall be punishable by a fine of not less 
than $200 and not exceeding $500 or by imprisonment not exceeding 30 days, or by both 
such fine and imprisonment . . . .”  Id. 
16 Schenectady, N.Y., Code § 167-67. 
17 Id. § 167-60 Application; standards; issuance; temporary certificate.  The RCO specifi-
3
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A. Factual and Procedural History 
Wisoff owns 12 two-family homes in the City of Schenec-
tady.18  Although Wisoff does not reside in the homes, he rents 
apartments within the homes to individuals and families.19  The City 
criminally charged Wisoff with “violating Chapter 167, Article X of 
the Code of the City of Schenectady.”20  The RCO requires all land-
lords to “submit a written application for a rental certificate [whenev-
er a vacancy exists or whenever there is a change in occupancy].”21  
Upon receiving such written application, the RCO allows the City to 
reserve the right to enter and inspect the premises by stating the fol-
lowing: 
During regular business hours or in an emergency, the 
Building Inspector[,] . . . upon the showing of proper 
credentials[,] . . . may enter any building or rental unit 
within a building.  If access to such property is re-
fused, the Building Inspector shall apply for a search 
warrant or court order in an appropriate court and up-
on a showing that there [are] reasonable grounds to 
believe that a building or rental unit within a building 
is rented and occupied in violation of this article.22 
Specifically, Wisoff rented apartments within his two-family homes 
without a valid rental certificate in violation of the RCO.23  Wisoff 
believed that requiring an inspection to obtain the rental certificate 
intruded on his Fourth Amendment rights.24  He argued that the RCO 
“deprived him of the beneficial use of his properties,” thereby affect-
 
cally allowed Building Inspectors to inspect a home to determine compliance with the fol-
lowing standards: light and ventilation, railings or parapet walls, exits, structural require-
ments, exterior protection, interior protection, plumbing, heating equipment, fire places, 
electrical wiring, cooking and refrigeration equipment, fire protection, maintenance require-
ments, exterior property areas, and prohibited storage areas.  The areas to be searched are 
subject to the discretion of the Building Inspector and, therefore, are substantially broad. 
18 Mem. Decision and Order at 3, Wisoff v. City of Schenectady, 1:07-CV-34 (N.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 9, 2009). 
19 Id. at 3-4. 
20 Id. at 4 n.4. 
21 Complaint and Notice of Removal, Wisoff v. Schenectady, No. 07-CV-0034, 2007 WL 
4653331 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2007). 
22 Schenectady, N.Y., Code § 167-61.EN(3) Right to enter and inspect. 
23 Wisoff, 984 N.Y.S.2d at 208. 
24 Id. 
4
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ing its economic value and his income.25  In an effort to have the 
RCO declared unconstitutional, Wisoff claimed that the RCO facili-
tates coercive consent and punishes those who reject inspection by 
imposing criminal penalties.26 
Wisoff filed a complaint against the City in 2007, alleging 
that the Code violated his right to privacy guaranteed under the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article 1, 
section 12 of the New York State Constitution, respectively.27  
Wisoff sought injunctive relief to prevent the City from pursuing 
criminal prosecution against him and a declaratory judgment finding 
the Code unconstitutional for violating the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and article 1, section 12 of the New York 
State Constitution.28 
The City responded with a counterclaim and filed for removal 
of the action to the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of New York.29  Following removal, Judge Mordue preserved 
Wisoff’s Fourth Amendment claims in the Northern District and re-
manded the state claims to the supreme court.30  Wisoff moved for 
summary judgment in the supreme court, and the City cross-moved 
for a dismissal of Wisoff’s state law claims.31  The supreme court 
granted the City’s cross-motion, declaring the RCO as “facially val-
id,” thereby prompting Wisoff’s subsequent motion and later ap-
peal.32 
B. A Critique of the Court’s Analysis in Wisoff v. City 
of Schenectady 
The court focused on the prerequisites of the inspection by 
noting that the RCO requires either consent or a search warrant to 
conduct an administrative inspection.33  Ultimately, the court held 
that the RCO was constitutional and did not violate Wisoff’s right to 
 
25 Id. at 209. 
26 Complaint and Notice of Removal, Wisoff v. Schenectady, supra note 21. 
27 Wisoff, 984 N.Y.S.2d at 208. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Wisoff, 984 N.Y.S.2d at 208. 
33 Id. at 209. 
5
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privacy.34  The court found that the prerequisites of either consent or 
a warrant safeguarded a person’s constitutional right to privacy.35  
The court held that the RCO safeguarded privacy interests because it 
did not permit a warrantless search, was not coercive, and was not 
purposeless.36  To pass constitutional muster, an ordinance must ei-
ther (1) require consent of the property owner to the inspection or (2) 
obtain the issuance of a valid judicial search warrant.37  The court’s 
holding implies that any ordinance that contains such prerequisites 
would consistently be found constitutional. 
However, the Wisoff court failed to consider the actual inspec-
tion in question.38  By assessing the constitutionality of the ordinance, 
the court did not analyze whether the actual inspection impinged on 
Wisoff’s privacy interest.  To determine whether an administrative 
inspection pursuant to a housing code is constitutional, New York 
courts should consider factors such as whether the ordinance serves a 
substantial governmental interest, whether the inspection is necessary 
to further those interests, the intrusiveness of the inspection, and 
whether the governmental interest in the search outweighs the indi-
vidual interest of privacy.39  Analyzing those factors will implement 
the federal approach, and thus would provide an analysis of both the 
constitutionality of the ordinance and the reasonableness of the in-
spection. 
III. FEDERAL APPROACH TO FOURTH AMENDMENT 
ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES 
The 1959 Supreme Court opinion in Frank v. Maryland initi-
ated the development of an approach to administrative inspections 
under the Fourth Amendment.40  In Frank v. Maryland, the Court 
noted that the factors used to assess a criminal search under the 
Fourth Amendment were not applicable to a housing inspection.41  In 
 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. (holding that the RCO serves the purpose of “a legitimate governmental goal”). 
37 Wisoff, 984 N.Y.S.2d at 209. 
38 Id. 
39 See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702-04 (1987).  See also Camara v. Municipal 
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967). 
40 Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959). 
41 Id. at 365-66 (holding that the defendant’s assertion of a subjective and objective expec-
tation of privacy was irrelevant because the search was not criminal in nature). 
6
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Frank, a city health inspector was trying to determine the source of 
rodent infestation within a neighborhood.42  Noticing that the defend-
ant’s home was in an “extreme state of decay,” the inspector request-
ed permission to enter the home.43  The defendant refused to grant the 
inspector entry, which prompted the defendant’s arrest.44 
The case resulted in a conviction based on the defendant’s re-
fusal to consent to a warrantless inspection pursuant to a city code, 
which permitted a search upon suspicion of an existing nuisance.45  
On appeal, the Criminal Court of Baltimore affirmed the defendant’s 
conviction.46  After the Maryland Court of Appeals denied certiorari, 
the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to deter-
mine the validity of the city code.47 
Noting the historical policy reasons for the city code, the 
Court ruled that the code was constitutional.48  The search in Frank 
was an administrative inspection, not a criminal search, although the 
Court did not clearly identify the search as administrative.  According 
to the Court, the code did not subject the defendant to criminal liabil-
ity upon a finding of a violation.49  Furthermore, the code furthered 
the interests of the community by maintaining minimum standards of 
hygiene and safety and, therefore, used careful delineation to ensure 
the defendant’s rights were protected.50  The strict limitations on the 
scope of the search fostered a privacy protection rather than a viola-
tion.51  The Court reasoned that the code served the general welfare 
of the community and did not seek to investigate criminal activity.52 
The Frank decision resulted in a very narrow and restrictive 
reading of the applicability of the Fourth Amendment.  The holding 
implies that individuals have Fourth Amendment protections only 
when they are suspected of a crime.  However, seven years later, the 
 
42 Id. at 361. 
43 Id.  The inspector observed a pile of “rodent feces mixed with straw and trash and de-
bris . . . .”  Id. 
44 Frank, 359 U.S. at 381. 
45 Id. at 361-62. 
46 Id. at 362. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 368-71. 
49 Frank, 359 U.S. at 367. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 366-67.  For an inspection to occur there must be valid grounds to suspect that a 
nuisance exists, the inspection must occur during the daytime, and the inspector cannot force 
entry.  Id. 
52 Id. at 367. 
7
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Supreme Court provided some guidance. 
A. The Significance of Camara v. Municipal Court 
In 1967, the Supreme Court, in Camara v. Municipal Court,53 
carved out the administrative inspection doctrine under the Fourth 
Amendment and, for the first time, ruled that administrative inspec-
tions infringe on the fundamental protection of privacy.  The Court 
had to determine whether administrative inspection programs violat-
ed the Fourth Amendment.54  The petitioner, Camara, faced criminal 
charges for violating the San Francisco Housing Code when he re-
fused to consent to a warrantless inspection of his ground floor 
apartment.55  The inspector entered the apartment building to conduct 
a routine annual inspection to ensure compliance with the city’s 
Housing Code.56  The building manager informed the inspector that 
Camara was a lessee of the ground floor.57  The inspector claimed 
that the building permit prohibited residential use of the ground floor 
and demanded to inspect Camara’s home.58  After Camara refused to 
permit the inspector to enter, the District Attorney’s office issued a 
subpoena.59 
Camara refused to appear, prompting inspectors to return to 
his apartment.  The inspectors advised Camara that the Housing Code 
required him to allow a warrantless search.60  Exercising his right to 
privacy, Camara again refused to give the inspectors access.61  His re-
sponse resulted in his arrest for refusing to consent to an inspection in 
violation of the Housing Code.62  While awaiting trial on his criminal 
case, Camara challenged the constitutionality of the Housing Code in 
California Superior Court.63  The Superior Court denied Camara’s 
motion, the District Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme 
 
53 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
54 Id. at 527. 
55 Id. at 525-27. 
56 Id. at 526. 
57 Id. 
58 Camara, 387 U.S. at 526. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 527. 
62 Id. 
63 Camara, 387 U.S. at 525. 
8
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Court of California denied Camara’s petition for a hearing.64  Camara 
then petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme Court. 
Justice White, writing for the majority, began his analysis by 
noting that the historically governing principle of the Fourth 
Amendment is that “except in certain carefully defined classes of 
cases, a search of private property without consent is unreasonable 
unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant.”65  The Court 
recognized that the Frank decision jeopardized the interests of home-
owners because it limited Fourth Amendment protections to only 
those individuals who are subjected to criminal investigations.66  Fur-
ther, the Court reasoned that the ordinance, like a warrantless crimi-
nal search, subjected owners to warrantless inspections without 
knowledge of whether the inspector is acting pursuant to a housing 
code, the lawful limits of a search, and the authority under which the 
inspector is acting.67 
However, Justice White also considered the public policy of 
administrative inspections.  The Court found that the public interest 
demands administrative searches because they facilitate the health 
and safety of urban communities.68  Determining whether administra-
tive searches facilitate the public interest depends on whether the 
burden of obtaining a warrant would “frustrate the governmental pur-
pose behind the search.”69  According to the majority, the burden of 
obtaining a warrant would not frustrate the governmental purpose be-
cause inspection programs could achieve the goals of safeguarding 
health and safety within the confines of a search warrant.70 
To distinguish Camara from Frank, the Court differentiated 
between a criminal and an administrative search.71  In criminal 
searches, to determine whether the search is reasonable, the Court in-
quired as to whether or not there is probable cause.72  The Court 
measures the probable cause standard by balancing the governmental 
interest justifying intrusion against the constitutionally protected in-
 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 528-29. 
66 Id. at 528. 
67 Id. at 532. 
68 Camara, 387 U.S. at 533. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 534-35. 
72 Id. 
9
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terests of the particular private citizen.73  Unlike a criminal search, 
administrative inspections, by design, seek to maintain citywide 
compliance with an ordinance to facilitate the health and safety of the 
community.74  To determine whether an administrative inspection is 
reasonable, probable cause must also exist.75  In administrative 
searches, the probable cause standard is measured by balancing the 
need for the inspection in terms of the goals of the code enforcement 
against the intrusiveness of the search.76 
In a six to three ruling, the Camara Court overruled the Frank 
decision, which had created an exceedingly broad exception to a war-
rantless search.77  The District Court of Appeals found section 503 
(the ordinance at issue in Camara) constitutional because the ordi-
nance “is part of a regulatory scheme which is essentially civil rather 
than criminal in nature, inasmuch as that section creates a right of in-
spection which is limited in scope and may not be exercised under 
unreasonable conditions.”78  The Supreme Court focused on whether 
the governmental interest justified a warrantless search.79  Further-
more, the Court assessed whether the burden of obtaining a warrant 
would frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search.80  Ac-
cordingly, the Court determined that a search could not be made 
without the owner’s consent unless the city first obtained a warrant.81  
Thus, the Court found the San Francisco ordinance unconstitutional 
because it permitted warrantless inspections to ensure compliance 
with the city’s housing code.82 
B. How the Camara Court Applied the New Standard 
The majority reasoned that the strict standards attending the 
issuance of a warrant in criminal cases are not applicable to the issu-
ance of a warrant authorizing an administrative inspection.83  The 
 
73 Camara, 387 U.S. at 535. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 536-37. 
77 Id. at 528. 
78 Camara, 387 U.S. at 528. 
79 Id. at 534-35. 
80 Id. at 533. 
81 Id. at 528-29. 
82 Id. at 540. 
83 Camara, 387 U.S. at 538. 
10
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Court considered the public’s need for effective enforcement of the 
regulation under the standard of reasonableness.84  Rather than re-
quiring individualized suspicion to satisfy the standard for obtaining 
a warrant, the Court broadened the concept of reasonableness.85  
Finding that the reasonableness standard was identical to the probable 
cause test, the Court weighed the governmental interests against the 
intrusiveness of the search.86 
To apply the new standard given by the Camara Court, the 
Court reasoned that reasonableness and probable cause are deter-
mined by the same test.87  The Court balanced the need for the in-
spection against the reasonable goals of the specific code or ordi-
nance in question.88  The goals of the inspection and code are “aimed 
at securing citywide compliance . . . to prevent even the unintentional 
development of conditions which are hazardous to public health and 
safety.”89  The Court conceded that a balancing test is the only way to 
apply the reasonableness test.90 
The holding in Camara fails to provide guidance to lower 
courts and, thus, will result in a lack of consistency in future applica-
tion.  The Camara decision implements a balancing test for adminis-
trative searches, but remains unclear in establishing which factors to 
consider.  The Camara holding only applies to residential properties; 
however, on the same day that the Court decided Camara, the Court 
ruled on See v. Seattle.91 
C. See v. Seattle 
In See v. Seattle, the Court applied the ruling in Camara to 
administrative searches of private commercial premises.92  In Seattle, 
the City of Seattle convicted and fined the appellant for refusing to 
consent to an administrative search by a representative of the City of 
Seattle Fire Department.93  The appellant was the owner of a com-
 
84 Id. at 539. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 535. 
87 Id. 
88 Camara, 387 U.S. at 536-37. 
89 Id. at 535. 
90 Id. at 540. 
91 387 U.S. 541 (1967). 
92 Id. at 542. 
93 Id. at 541. 
11
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mercial warehouse.94  The City conducted an inspection to maintain 
compliance pursuant to Seattle’s Fire Code.95  The inspector sought 
entry without a warrant and without any existing probable cause to 
believe that there was a violation of the code.96  The appellant refused 
to permit the inspector inside to conduct a warrantless search of his 
locked commercial warehouse.97  The City then arrested and charged 
the appellant with violating the Fire Code by refusing to consent to a 
warrantless search.98  The issue presented was whether Camara ap-
plied to administrative inspections of commercial premises that were 
not used as private residences.99 
To reach a decision, the Court compared the constitutional 
rights of a private homeowner to the rights of a business owner.100  
Like a private homeowner, the business owner had a constitutional 
right to be free from unreasonable searches of his private commercial 
property.101  The business owner, like the private homeowner, would 
suffer a violation of his constitutional rights in the event of an inspec-
tion without a warrant.102  The Court compared this commercial ad-
ministrative inspection to administrative subpoenas for corporate 
books and records.103  Because administrative subpoenas require a 
warrant, the Court reasoned that a warrant ought to be required for 
administrative inspections of commercial premises.104  The Court 
held that inspections of commercial property, which are not open to 
the public, may only be executed under the authorization of a valid 
warrant.105  However, the Court clarified that this is not a bright-line 
rule and that each factual situation requires a case-by-case analysis 
pursuant to a standard of reasonableness.106 
Adhering to the rule in Camara, the Court reversed the appel-
lant’s conviction for refusing to permit the Fire Inspector to conduct a 
 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Seattle, 387 U.S. at 541. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 542. 
100 Id. at 543. 
101 Seattle, 387 U.S. at 543. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 544. 
104 Id. at 545. 
105 Id. 
106 Seattle, 387 U.S at 545-46. 
12
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warrantless search.107  Justice White, again writing for the majority, 
concluded that non-consensual “administrative [inspections]. . . of 
commercial premises which are not open to the public may only be 
compelled through prosecution or . . . a warrant procedure.”108 
D. Carving the Exception in Pervasively Regulated 
Business 
Following the rulings in Camara and Seattle, the Supreme 
Court had many opportunities to determine the constitutionality of 
administrative inspections.  The last administrative inspection case 
before the Supreme Court was New York v. Burger.109  The Burger 
opinion clearly provides a historical analysis of the Fourth Amend-
ment’s application to regulated industries.110  In Burger, the respond-
ent owned an automobile junkyard in Brooklyn, New York.111  Five 
plainclothes police officers entered the respondent’s place of business 
to inspect pursuant to a statute.112  The purpose of the inspection was 
to uncover any stolen vehicles or car parts and to ensure compliance 
with registration codes.113  After obtaining consent to inspect, the of-
ficers determined that several vehicles and parts had been stolen.114  
They arrested the respondent and charged him with five counts of 
possession of stolen property and one count of unregistered operation 
as a vehicle dismantler.115 
The respondent moved to suppress the evidence obtained, 
claiming that the search and statute were unconstitutional.116  The tri-
al court denied the respondent’s motion, finding that the junkyard 
business was a pervasively regulated business; therefore, warrantless 
administrative inspections were appropriate.117  The Appellate Divi-
sion affirmed the trial court’s decision.118  The New York Court of 
 
107 Id. at 546. 
108 Id. at 545. 
109 482 U.S. 691 (1987). 
110 Id. at 699-703. 
111 Id. at 693. 
112 Id. at 693-94. 
113 Id. at 694-95. 
114 Burger, 482 U.S. at 695. 
115 Id. at 695-96. 
116 Id. at 696. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 696-97. 
13
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Appeals then reversed on the ground that the statute authorized war-
rantless searches solely to uncover evidence of criminality and not to 
enforce regulation.119  The United States Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari.120 
The Court in Burger considered whether an otherwise proper 
administrative inspection was unconstitutional when the sole purpose 
of the statute is to deter criminal behavior.121  The Court noted that 
the general rule is that a warrantless inspection in the context of a 
pervasively regulated business will be deemed reasonable so long as 
three criteria are met.122  The Court incorporated the factors of prior 
business administrative inspection decisions into a three-part test123: 
First, there must be a “substantial” government inter-
est that informs the regulatory scheme pursuant to 
which the inspection is made.  Second, the warrantless 
inspections must be “necessary to further the regulato-
ry scheme.”  Finally, the “statute’s inspection pro-
gram, in terms of the certainty and regularity of its ap-
plication, must provide a constitutionally adequate 
substitute for a warrant.”124 
Acknowledging that the third step is flexible in its application, the 
Court clarified that, by requiring the statute to be “sufficiently com-
prehensive and defined[,] that the owner of commercial property can-
not help but be aware that his property will be subject to periodic in-
spections undertaken for a specific purpose.”125  The Burger Court 
determined that the statute allowing warrantless administrative in-
spections fell within the pervasively regulated business exception.126  
To further consider whether the statute is reasonable, the Court fo-
cused on the duration of such regulation and its limitations.127  Under 
that purview, the Court found that the warrantless administrative in-
spection was appropriate because it was limited in time, place, and 
 
119 Burger, 482 U.S. at 697-98. 
120 Id. at 698. 
121 Id. at 693. 
122 Id. at 702. 
123 Id. at 702. 
124 Burger, 482 U.S. at 702-03. 
125 Id. at 703. 
126 Id. at 712. 
127 Id. at 711. 
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scope.128 
Finally, to reconcile the analysis with past precedent, Justice 
Blackmun traced the history of pervasively regulated business inspec-
tions that have been upheld as constitutional.129  In doing so, the 
Burger decision provides a framework to assess the breadth of the 
Fourth Amendment with respect to warrantless inspections of perva-
sively regulated businesses. 
E. Implication of the Supreme Court Decisions 
Over time, the Supreme Court’s decisions have expanded the 
applicability of the Fourth Amendment to administrative inspections 
and have provided some guidance in determining the applicability of 
the Fourth Amendment to civil searches.  However, these decisions 
lack consistency, which is attributed to the lack of clarity in determin-
ing which approach is the most appropriate in assessing the constitu-
tionality of an inspection. 
The Court stressed the importance of balancing the interests, 
reasonableness, level of intrusiveness, and traditional probable cause.  
However, it has provided little guidance to the lower courts as to 
whether they must weigh all of these factors when determining the 
constitutionality of an inspection.  Unlike the United States Supreme 
Court, New York state courts implement a narrow approach when 
considering the constitutionality of a city or town ordinance. 
IV. NEW YORK STATE APPROACHES TO ADMINISTRATIVE 
INSPECTIONS 
In People v. Northrop,130 the City Court of Long Beach de-
clared that an administrative search is an inspection by administrative 
 
128 Id. 
129 Burger, 482 U.S. at 699-703.  See also Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 
U.S. 72, 75, 77 (1970) (holding that a warrantless search of a catering business pursuant to a 
federal statute enforced the long standing history of regulation within the liquor industry); 
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316-17 (1972) (holding that warrantless inspection of 
licensed firearm dealers was appropriately within the “licensing program” inspection excep-
tion); Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 324 (1978) (holding that a warrantless in-
spection, pursuant to the Occupational Safety and Health Act, was unconstitutional); Do-
novan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 606 (1981) (holding that the Federal Mine Safety and Health 
Act of 1977 that authorized warrantless inspections of underground and surface mines was 
constitutional). 
130 410 N.Y.S.2d 32 (City Ct. 1978). 
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officials to determine whether a property owner is complying with 
building regulations.131  Thus, when faced with the issue of adminis-
trative searches, New York courts determine the constitutionality of 
the search by evaluating the implications of the statute.132 
A. The Foundation of Sokolov v. Freeport 
In 1981, the Court of Appeals ruled on the constitutionality of 
a municipal ordinance,133 which required a landlord to consent to a 
warrantless inspection of his property in order to obtain a rental per-
mit.134  The purpose of the ordinance was to ensure that the property 
was “safe, clean, sanitary, in good repair, and free from rodents and 
vermin.”135 
The appellants owned rental property in Freeport, New 
York.136  The state prosecuted the appellants for violating a rental or-
dinance that makes failure to obtain rental permits illegal.137  The trial 
court held the ordinance was unconstitutional because it permitted 
warrantless administrative searches and, therefore, infringed upon the 
owners’ Fourth Amendment rights.138  The Appellate Division, rely-
ing on precedent where a similar ordinance was held constitutional, 
reversed.139  The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s 
decision.140 
The Court of Appeals evaluated the constitutionality of the 
ordinance by focusing on the Supreme Court cases of Camara v. Mu-
nicipal Court and See v. Seattle.141  The court distinguished Sokolov 
from the federal cases, noting that the Freeport ordinance was coer-
cive.142  Although the ordinance did not directly authorize warrantless 
 
131 Id. at 34. 
132 Id. at 35. 
133 Sokolov v. Freeport, 420 N.E.2d 55 (N.Y. 1981). 
134 Id. at 56. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Sokolov, 420 N.E.2d at 56. 
139 Id.  The Appellate Division relied on Loventhal v. City of Mount Vernon, 379 N.Y.S.2d 
130 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1976) (holding that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the City’s 
Police Power, and the ordinance did not have the effect of coercing consent to warrantless 
searches in violation of the Constitution). 
140 Sokolov, 420 N.E.2d at 59. 
141 Id. at 56. 
142 Id. at 56-58. 
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inspections, the court found that it facilitated coercive consent to a 
warrantless inspection, making it unconstitutional.143  The coercive 
effect of the ordinance penalized owners who refused to consent to a 
warrantless search.144  To further consider the constitutionality of the 
ordinance, the court then shifted its focus to the timing of the inspec-
tion.145  The inspection occurred two business days after the property 
owners notified the Department of Buildings of a vacancy, thus, mak-
ing the owners aware that the inspection was imminent.146  The court 
concluded that the differences between the ordinance in question and 
those in the Supreme Court cases were inconsequential.147 
The Sokolov court also considered the degree of intrusion.148  
The attorneys for the Village of Freeport argued that the intrusion 
was minimal because the inspection occurred while the premises 
were vacant.149  The court did not find this argument compelling be-
cause the search took place within two days after notification of va-
cancy; therefore, there was a risk that the tenant’s belongings would 
be present in the residential space.150 
Although the court held the rental permit ordinance unconsti-
tutional, it observed that the ruling did not disturb the goals of the or-
dinance.151  Such a ruling upholds the public interest value in having 
such an ordinance.  Ultimately, the court held that the ordinance was 
unconstitutional because landlords in the rental business are entitled 
to Fourth Amendment protections just as homeowners, and ordinanc-
es that penalized landlords who failed to consent to a warrantless 
search violated those protections.152 
B. The Expansion of Sokolov v. Freeport and Its 
Influence on New York Cases 
The Court of Appeals, in Pashcow v. Babylon,153 held that an 
 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 57. 
145 Sokolov, 420 N.E.2d at 58. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 57. 
148 Id. at 58. 
149 Id. 
150 Sokolov, 420 N.E.2d at 58. 
151 Id. at 58-59. 
152 Id. at 55. 
153 421 N.E.2d 498 (1981). 
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ordinance requiring an owner to consent to a warrantless search was 
unconstitutional.154  In Pashcow, the ordinance in question required 
either consent or a warrant, except in an emergency situation, in order 
for a landlord to rent the premises.155  The court held that the ordi-
nance was unconstitutional because an owner’s ability to rent his or 
her premises cannot be conditioned upon consent to a warrantless in-
spection.156 
Just as the Supreme Court made Camara applicable to com-
mercial premises, so too did the New York courts.157  In Brookhaven 
v. Ronkonkoma Realty Corp.,158 the defendant owned a multiple resi-
dence facility in a town that required owners of facilities to obtain a 
permit in order to operate the facility.159  To obtain a permit, the 
owner must submit to a warrantless physical inspection.160  Failure to 
obtain a permit would subject the owner to high fines and imprison-
ment.161  Applying the ruling in Sokolov, the court held that the ordi-
nance in Brookhaven violated an owner’s right to be free from unrea-
sonable searches.162 
In 1992, the Third Department’s decision in Stender v. Alba-
ny163 created a domino effect on future New York cases.  In Stender, 
the plaintiff owned several rental properties in a city that required 
owners to obtain permits prior to renting the units within a dwell-
ing.164  The plaintiff consented to an inspection to obtain the per-
mit.165  The housing code in question precluded a non-compliant 
landlord from collecting rent within the dwelling unit until the land-
lord obtained a permit.166  The court held that such a penalty preclud-
ing a landlord from collecting rent after refusing an unconstitutional 
 
154 Id. at 498. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 Compare See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), with Brookhaven v. Ronkonkoma Realty 
Corp., 547 N.Y.S.2d 68 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1989). 
158 547 N.Y.S.2d 68 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1989). 
159 Id. at 69. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. (stating that a violator will be subjected to fines up to $500 and imprisonment up to 
six months for every day the facility operates without a permit). 
162 Id. 
163 592 N.Y.S.2d 70 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1992). 
164 Id. at 71. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
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search violated the Fourth Amendment.167 
C. A Deviation from the New York Norm 
As time progressed, New York courts started to analyze ad-
ministrative searches under more heightened scrutiny to determine 
the constitutionality of an ordinance.  The heightened scrutiny result-
ed in a new burden upon the petitioner to require a showing that the 
owner faced a penalty as a result of the ordinance.  To require a 
showing that an owner suffered a penalty implies that a violation of 
the right to privacy does not rise to the level of a penalty; rather, this 
heightened scrutiny meant that owners should endure more damages.  
A number of later cases demonstrates how this additional burden re-
quires a homeowner to suffer not only a constitutional violation, but 
also a monetary, criminal, civil, or personal penalty. 
In McLean v. City of Kingston,168 the plaintiff complied with 
the housing ordinances in obtaining permits to schedule an inspection 
date.  However, the plaintiff failed to appear for the scheduled in-
spection, resulting in re-inspection fees of $150 for each missed ap-
pointment.169  The plaintiff sought to have the ordinance declared un-
constitutional because the ordinance lacked the requirement of a 
search warrant and, thus, only required consent from the owner to en-
ter the premises.170  The court held that the ordinance was constitu-
tional because a non-compliant owner did not face criminal penalties, 
but instead faced only monetary penalties as a result of the owner’s 
carelessness.171  Further, the court based its decision on the lack of a 
penalty suffered by the plaintiff.172  Then, in a 2013 opinion, the 
Fourth Department expressly required a petitioner to demonstrate that 
 
167 Id. at 72. 
168 869 N.Y.S.2d 685, 686 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2008).  The City of Kingston required 
owners to schedule appointments for inspection of the rental properties.  A letter stating the 
date and time of the inspection was sent to the owner, and if the owner was unable to make 
the appointment, the owner was directed to call to cancel or face a $150 re-inspection fee.  
Id. at 686. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 687. 
171 Id. at 688. 
172 McLean, 869 N.Y.S.2d at 688.  The court stated that the plaintiff failed to make a 
showing of how the ordinance was unconstitutional as applied to him; therefore, there was 
no violation.  The court now places a burden on the plaintiff to make a showing that not only 
was the ordinance unconstitutional, but in exercising his constitutional rights, the owner was 
penalized.  Id. 
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the ordinance imposed an actual penalty to render it unconstitution-
al.173 
In Cappon v. Carballada,174 the petitioner was charged with 
violating a city code for failing to renew a certificate of occupancy 
for his rental property.  The ordinance required that, upon renewal of 
the certificate of occupancy, the inspection could occur either upon 
consent or upon the issuance of a warrant.175  The court held that the 
petitioner made no showing that he was actually penalized for failing 
to consent to a warrantless search.176  The court reasoned that the or-
dinance triggers the administrative inspection when the owner applies 
for a renewal certificate; thus, in this case, the ordinance never trig-
gered the administrative inspection because the owner never applied 
for a renewal.177  Therefore, the ordinance did not unconstitutionally 
penalize the plaintiff.  In light of the various approaches of the feder-
al and state courts, the Wisoff decision requires a stricter analysis. 
V. THE THIRD DEPARTMENT’S DECISION IN WISOFF 
The City of Rochester argued that the RCO was constitutional 
because the consent and warrant requirements of the RCO complied 
with constitutional interests.178  However, under the federal approach, 
a more detailed analysis must drive the determination of whether the 
RCO comports with Fourth Amendment protections.  Under the Ca-
mara approach, to determine whether the RCO is constitutional, the 
court must first assess whether the burden of obtaining a warrant 
would frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search.179  Simi-
lar to other ordinances, the governmental purpose of the RCO is to 
ensure the health and safety of the tenants.  The burden of obtaining a 
warrant would not frustrate the governmental purpose because the 
ordinance clearly states that the city will procure a warrant if the 
owner does not consent to the search.  Thus, obtaining a warrant does 
 
173 Cappon v. Carballada, 971 N.Y.S.2d 615 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2013). 
174 971 N.Y.S.2d 615, 617 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2013). 
175 Id. at 616-17.  The City code required owners to obtain a certificate of occupancy with-
in 90 days prior to the expiration of the current certificate.  Upon application for a renewal of 
the certificate of occupancy, the owner’s premises are subjected to an inspection.  Id. 
176 Id. at 617-18. 
177 Id. at 617. 
178 Wisoff, 984 N.Y.S.2d at 209. 
179 Camara, 387 U.S. at 533. 
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not frustrate the governmental goal.180 
Further, the New York courts should adopt the Camara bal-
ancing test and weigh the interests of the government against the pri-
vacy interests of Wisoff to determine whether there is a Fourth 
Amendment violation.  In order to balance the interests, the New 
York courts should determine the public need for effective enforce-
ment of the particular ordinance.  In Wisoff, a strong public need ex-
isted that called for effective enforcement of the RCO because of the 
potential of twenty-four families living in unsafe, unhealthy, and un-
inhabitable conditions.  The governmental purpose of facilitating the 
health and safety of these twenty-four families outweighed Wisoff’s 
interests because poor housing standards and conditions can debilitate 
the economic value of the City of Schenectady. 
Finally, the last consideration is whether the search in Wisoff 
falls under the pervasively regulated business exception to Camara 
and Seattle, which requires the application of Burger.  First, a sub-
stantial governmental interest exists because conducting inspections 
under the RCO ensures the health and safety of tenants and preserves 
the economic value of housing in Schenectady.  These interests facili-
tate the regulatory scheme of the RCO which does not allow for arbi-
trary and unexpected inspections; rather, the RCO permits inspec-
tions upon notification of the owner.  Second, warrantless inspections 
are necessary to further the regulatory scheme, because if a high 
number of owners refused consent, then the population of prospective 
homeless tenants would increase.  Lastly, the RCO’s inspection pro-
gram provides for a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant 
by requesting consent from the owner. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The leading New York case, Sokolov v. Freeport, determined 
the constitutionality of the ordinance by assessing the “degree of in-
trusion” of the administrative search.  The Wisoff opinion, however, 
lacked this treatment in its analysis.  To determine the constitutionali-
ty of the ordinance, the Wisoff court examined the plain meaning of 
the statute.  By focusing on the express language of the statute, the 
Wisoff court determined that the methodology that triggers a search is 
inherently constitutional; therefore, the ordinance itself is constitu-
 
180 Wisoff, 984 N.Y.S.2d at 208. 
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tional. 
When examined together, the New York decisions illustrate 
that courts are following a trend of analyzing warrantless inspection 
claims by assessing whether the respective ordinance requires either 
consent or a warrant.  This is where New York courts are mistaken.  
The inquiry is not only to determine the constitutionality of the ordi-
nance.  Instead, the challenge stems from the intrusion of the gov-
ernment by executing a search pursuant to the ordinance.  Therefore, 
New York courts should analyze the constitutionality of the inspec-
tion in question as well as the ordinance.  Such an inquiry will pre-
vent arbitrary and capricious governmental invasions of the interests 
of residents and building owners. 
By adopting the broad, federal approach, New York courts 
would effectively determine the constitutionality of a statute and 
search.  To date, New York courts are not clear as to what makes an 
ordinance unconstitutional.  Wisoff is illustrative of a valid adminis-
trative search because it demonstrated what makes an ordinance con-
stitutional.  Wisoff sends a message to the public that ordinances are 
presumptively constitutional, and furthermore, if the ordinance re-
quires consent or a warrant for entry, then it upholds constitutional 
rights to be free from warrantless searches. 
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